13/ “WHEN YOU BUY PROPERTY THAT BELONGED TO A BAD PERSON”: The bank foreclosed on Willis. The bank sold the land to P.H. She and her son J.H. invested in improving the land. Willis forged P.H.’s signature on a quitclaim deed that purported to transfer the land back to Willis. When P.H. and J.H. later attempted to sell the foreclosed property, Willis’s forged quitclaim deed and continual harassment of potential buyers interfered with those efforts.
Based on the forged quitclaim deed, the State charged Willis with aggravated forgery. Willis pleaded not guilty and, after a jury trial, the jury found Willis guilty of aggravated forgery.
At Willis’s February 2015 sentencing, the district court imposed a presumptive guideline sentence. The court also told Willis that it was “reserving restitution for 90 days to allow the State and the victims to come forward with a claim or claims and then [Willis] would have that right to challenge it through the restitution process set forth by statute.”
At the restitution hearing, the State presented a letter from P.H.’s attorney describing the $2,000 in legal fees P.H. incurred to clear the title to the foreclosed property. The district court asked if Willis had any objections to the letter, and Willis replied, “Yes, I would object to this exhibit here.” The court overruled Willis’s objection and admitted the letter. Later in the hearing, the State offered a group of e-mails exchanged between J.H. and several real estate agents that described how Willis had interfered with the agents’ efforts to show the foreclosed property to prospective buyers. Willis objected to the admissibility of the e-mails on hearsay grounds. When the court asked the State to respond to Willis’s objection, the State replied, “the Rules of Evidence . . . don’t strictly apply . . . to a restitution hearing and [J.H.] is qualified to explain the document.” The court responded, “Okay. On that basis, I’ll overrule the objection.” Willis made similar objections to five additional exhibits during the restitution hearing, all of which were admitted over his objections.
After the restitution hearing, the district court filed a written order requiring Willis to pay P.H. restitution in the amount of $10,742, including the $2,000 in legal fees outlined in the letter from P.H.’s attorney. The order contained findings of fact that were based on the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, including the evidence to which Willis objected. Willis appealed the restitution order.
On appeal, Willis challenged the district court’s evidentiary rulings, arguing that the district court erred in failing to apply the Minnesota Rules of Evidence at the restitution hearing. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The court of appeals concluded that “the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence,” and because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing proceedings, “it follows that the evidentiary rules do not apply to restitution hearings.”
Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Gildea reversed the lower courts because the law which allows the use of hearsay evidence did not include restitution hearings. The Supreme Court remanded the issue of restitution to the district court to resolve Willis’ obligation to the damaged family without relying on hearsay evidence.
READ THE FULL CASE DECISION:
July 12, 2017 2017-073
READ THE FULL CASE DECISION:
July 12, 2017 2017-073
https://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/supct/2017/OPA160275-071217.pdf
No comments:
Post a Comment